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Abstract 
Taiwan’s strategic geopolitical position—along with domestic political       
developments—have put the country in turmoil ever since the post-Chinese civil war.            
In particular, its antagonistic, cross-strait relationship with China has led to various            
negative consequences and cast a spotlight on the country on the international            
diplomatic front for close to over six decades. After the end of the Cold War, the                
democratization of Taiwan altered her political identity and released a nation-building           
process that was seemingly irreversible. Taiwan’s nation-building efforts have moved          
the nation further away from reunification with China. With that, the people’s            
sentiments (especially those of the younger generation) of China have deteriorated           
and see it as a prime economic and democratic political threat, giving rise to the               
Sunflower student movement. Due to this increased resentment towards and tension           
with China, Taiwan has compromised its pre-existing vulnerable geopolitical position          
and the help it receives from the outside world. While that may be the case, this study                 
suggests that the strong Taiwanese identity amongst young Taiwanese is due to            
contextual influences and that their attitudes toward China is fluid and can be shaped              
by their environment.  
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Introduction 
Taiwan’s history has been fraught with a series of identity challenges that pit             
its strategic geopolitical location against its democratization and nation-building         
process. Forty years after the Chinese Civil War, Taiwan’s position as a fault line in               
the Cold war along with Kuomintang’s ambition to reunify with China has stunted             
Taiwan’s political growth and building of its nation. In the 1980s, Taiwan’s dual             
process of democratization and nation building was then prioritized, presenting it with            
new geo-strategic obstacles for both Taiwan and China and the rest of the world.  
Political leaders in Taiwan often have to deal with an extremely precarious            
and compromised geo-strategic situation that impacts all facets of Taiwan’s political           
environment, giving Taiwan’s external backers (especially the United States of          
America) an enduring and keen interest in the domestic affairs of Taiwan. Taiwan’s             
steady deterioration of global recognition, where an increasing number of countries           
refuse to recognize its sovereignty, meant that it is even more reliant on its few               
existing backers like the USA, resulting in further restrictions on its political            
developments within the country. Taiwan’s continually struggles to balance its pursuit           
of an independent political identity that is aligned with its people’s views with the              
external restrictions that are increasing because of various countries’ interest in and            
relationship with the new global superpower—China.  
As such, Taiwan’s history is aligned with international strategic shifts and           
China’s powerful position in these shifts. In the 1940s to 1980s, Taiwan ability to              
successfully strengthen its financial markets was a deterrent against the spread of            
Communism in East Asia. During the Cold War era, Taiwan was able to gain strong               
external supporters and independence as an autonomous state due to its           
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anti-Communist stance recognized by the rest of the world. After the 1980s, Taiwan             
progressively democratized its nation with competitive elections and large political          
parties, further enhancing the government’s legitimacy . Yet, because of its special           1
geo-strategic position, not many countries have heard about its efficient and smooth            
democratization process as well as its quest for a strong national identity. Hence,             
Taiwan’s pursuit of independence remains uncertain.  
This project seeks to examine the historical events that have occurred and            
relate them to survey data in order to examine Taiwanese residents’ fluid national             
identity and to seek out possible alternatives to the cross-straits conflicts. This            
research examines the historical events that took place in Taiwan and their impact on              
the cross-strait relationship, with an emphasis on how it has influenced and altered             
national identity in Taiwan.  
 
Literature Review  
Previous research about the cross-strait relationship between China and         
Taiwan has sought to examine the economic and political impact on both countries.   2
However, the existing literature has yet to sufficiently analyze how the           
national identity of the people in Taiwan has been shaped by this antagonistic             
relationship. Taiwan’s national identity is difficult to measure. Even though          
researchers have tried to explicate Taiwanese’ voting behavior using their national           
identity, it seems like there is noticeable fluidity in self-identity. Besides surveys,            3
primary research materials, demography, analysis of content, analysis of discourses          
1 ​Wachman, Alan. 1994. ​Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization​. Amonk: M.E. Sharpe 
2 Ibid. 
3 ​Kuo, Alexander and Margalit, Yotam. 2012. Measuring Individual Identity. ​Comparative Politics​, 
44(4): 459-479 
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are some of the approaches that is utilized in existing research to measure national              
identity.   4
In this essay, which examines national identity, it is important to note that             
research often utilizes two approaches—the constructivism and the primordialism         
approach.  
Constructivism examines the intimate relationship between a nation and a          
nation state. A nation is a social construct and may even be seen as an imagined                
community that sets the foundation for the rise of the nation-state. Nationalism is a              5
political precept in which national and political units need to be in line with one               
another. 
However, the primordialist approach views the actual social presence of          
groups that create a subjective consciousness as well as reciprocal emotional           
connections. Such social presence include features like customs, language, beliefs,          
shared experiences and ethnicity . As such, national identity is one that is deeply             6
rooted in an individual. Even though it may be fluid, it should stabilize over time .  7
Even so, scholars also recognize that there may be instances in which one will              
have an affiliation to more than just one national identity. Smith (1986) argues that              
there is a “dual attachment” – loyalty to the political administration, which is seen in               
terms of obligations and rights of the citizens, and loyalty to the ethnic community.              
4 ​Brady, H. E., and Kaplan, C. 2009. ​Conceptualizing and measuring ethnic identity​. In R. Abdelal, Y. 
Herrera, A. Johnston and R. McDermott (eds), Measuring Identity: A Guide for Social Scientists, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 33-71. 
5 ​Anderson, Benedict. 1991. ​Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism​. Revised Edition. New York: Verso. 
6 ​Verkuyten, Maykel. 2005. ​The Social Psychology of Ethnic Identity​. New York: Psychology Press. 
7 ​Huntington, Samuel P. 1996. ​The Crash of Civilizations and the Remarking of World Order​. New 
York: Simon & Schuster.  
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Kuo and Margalit (2012) also explicate the idea of “situationalism” whereby people            
alter their identity in response to what is happening around them. This is seen in their                
research on Georgia where the strength of the situation influenced how much it alters              
national identity. Therefore, a change in context and environment may cause an            
alteration in an individual’s affiliation to a particular nation or nation-state. This            
approach is useful in my research in order to find out whether Taiwanese people’s              
identity is something that is fixed, or it is fluid that changes according to the               
environment.  
 
Historical Background  
To better understand Taiwan’s current situation in global politics, it is           
important to understand how they got into this situation in the first place. According              
to Ai Dun’s ​Shattering the Myths: Taiwanese Identity and the Legacy of KMT             
Colonialism​, Taiwan’s geo-strategic position was a result of Kuomintang’s loss in the            
Chinese civil war and its flight to Taiwan. At that time, it built up an authoritarian                
government and constructed a Sinic social identity. Even though it was only in             
control of an extremely small territory, Taiwan and Kuomintang were seen as China’s             
official representatives. Besides being one of the founding members of the United            
Nations, Taiwan also secured a treaty with the United States defending itself against             
foreign threats (i.e. the Chinese in this case). Doing so secured Taiwan’s position as              
the official representative of the non-communist Chinese people. The treaty that they            
had with the United States of America came in useful during the first Taiwan-China              
Straits crisis when Matsu and Kinmen islands were bombed by China.   8
8 Ai Dun. 2004. Shattering the Myths: Taiwanese Identity and the Legacy of KMT Colonialism. 
Taipei: Yushan Chushanbe. 
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However, global support for Taiwan declined after the Soviet-Sino split and           
the halt in the Cold War. In 1971, votes from the council of the United Nations poured                 
in to recognize the People’s Republic of China, transferring the administrative power            
from Taiwan (Republic of China) to the People’s Republic of China. Even though the              
United States of America was initially in support of an independent Taiwanese state,             
Nixon’s 1972’s visit to China caused the tables to be overturned, supporting instead             
the One China principle.   9
Internally, Kuomintang’s pursuit of reunification further fortified Taiwan’s        
cultural and political identification with China. The Kuomintang argued that it has            
brought many Chinese treasures to Taiwan and wanted to bring Taiwan back to China             
. A significant example was the party’s endeavor to compel its people to use              10
Mandarin as the official language, replacing the local dialect od Minnan and further             
strengthening the political power of the Mainlander Chinese minority. As such,           
ambivalence in Taiwan remains as some people see themselves as both Chinese and             
Taiwanese while others long for a separate state.  
Currently, China’s anti-secession law on Taiwan is a reflection of Beijing’s           
deep-seated concerns with the domestic developments in Taiwan and is an indication            
of its willingness to look towards forcing a reunification even though it may be              
fraught with extremely high costs. The increasing influence of the people’s voice            
regarding Chinese foreign policy is making the cross-strait relations even more           
complex.  
9 Wachman, Alan. 1994. Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization. Amonk: M.E. Sharpe 
10 ​Ai Dun. 2004. ​Shattering the Myths: Taiwanese Identity and the Legacy of KMT Colonialism​. 
Taipei: Yushan Chushanbe. 
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Today, Taiwan is a society that is still in evolution, moving quickly away from              
the international views of what Taiwan is and how Taiwan perceives its relationship             
with China. As with the ambitious endeavor by the Kuomintang, modern Taiwan            
systematically alters its domestic affairs and does not rely on the influence by a              
foreign authoritarian rule. Such autonomy that Taiwan displays may suggest that this            
evolution is irreversible. Alan Wachman states in ​Taiwan: National Identity and           
Democratization that in 1988, after the death of Chiang Kai-shek’s son – Chiang             
Ching-kuo, Kuomintang appointed Lee Teng-hui as the President of Taiwan, as well            
as the head of the party. This was a move to introduce a native Taiwanese into the                 
party in order to alter the Kuomintang’s strong identity towards Mainland China. As             
such, Lee was the first-ever native Taiwanese president. His leadership caused the            
Kuomintang to steer away from its goal of reunification with China, allowing insteaed             
for Taiwan to democratize. In the early 1990s, Lee oversaw a pragmatic diplomacy             
foreign policy to challenge the policies regarding the reunification of China. He saw             
the need for Taiwan to be seen as a separate and distinct state from the control of                 
China. Some of his moves included participating in the United Nations. The            
Kuomintang government permitted elections for the National Assembly and the          
Legislative Yuan in 1991. In that year, they also released all-new guidelines for the              
unification of the nation.   11
These guidelines were crucial in defining the way Taiwan saw unification with            
China. Reunification of Taiwan with China was perceived as a long-standing political            
issue that is reliant on the democratic political reforms in China and the acceptance of               
the Taiwanese people. There wasn’t any form of planning and time frame for             
11 Wachman, Alan. 1994. Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization. Amonk: M.E. Sharpe 
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reunification and the situation placed the responsibility on China to ensure the            
conditions were optimal for a smooth and voluntary reunification. The 1994           
Taiwanese White Paper even went on to predict that China’s continuous absence of             
political reform and its antagonism towards political development in Taiwan would           
increasingly lead to stronger support for Taiwan’s independence.   12
In 1996, Lee then began publicly promoting Taiwan’s shift away from the            
goal of reunification. As a result, China responded by cancelling the track-two talks             
with Taiwan. During Taiwan’s presidential campaign, China also test fired missiles in            
the areas surrounding Taiwan in an attempt to get citizens to not vote for Lee. This                
sparked the beginning of the complicated cross-straits relations. The 2000 China’s           
White Paper even went to the extreme of relegating Lee to one who sabotaged the               
peace and stability of the cross-strait relationship, and as an obstacle to China’s             
relationship with the United States of America. As a matter of fact, even Lee’s              
political rise was a hyperbolic reflection of Taiwan’s identity changes.   13
Chen Shui-bian, who was part of the Democratic Progressive Party, then took            
over the political leadership of Taiwan in 2000, further advancing its political goals             
towards an autonomous state. He wanted to extend the Taiwan First approach to             
continue what his predecessors started. Winning the election came as a surprise as the              
democratic progressive party came from illegal opposition movements in the past.           
During his administration, the cross-strait relations were tense. For instance, China,           
for the seventh time, obstructed Taiwan’s effort to be part of the World Health              
Organization (WHO) during the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic.          
12  Ai Dun. 2004. Shattering the Myths: Taiwanese Identity and the Legacy of KMT Colonialism. 
Taipei: Yushan Chushanbe. 
13 White Paper. 2000. The One China Principle and the Taiwan Issue. Retrieved from: www. 
chinaconsulate.se/Content/Taiwan/whitepaper1.htm. 
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Because of that, Chen blamed China for the massive spread of SARS and further              
started a referendum for Taiwan to join the WHO. Chen also managed to hold a               14
second term in his presidency. According to Tim Culpan’s ​Taiwan Alters Arms            
Referendum Language​, during the election for presidency, he held two contentious           
referenda as a defense mechanism against China . Furthermore, Chen’s government          15
amended the curriculum in schools by seeing China as a separate and foreign state.              
These small-scale policies were extremely pertinent in shaping the Taiwanese          
identity.  
With these changes in the political and educational landscape, the Taiwanese           
began to question their identity and the attitudes they had toward China and Taiwan,              
as well as the relationship between both countries. Therefore, both Lee and Chen             
played pertinent roles in encouraging residents to question their identity and creating            
an all-new Taiwanese political and social identity that is far from that of China.  
However, in 2008, Ma Ying-jeou of Kuomintang won the presidential seat,           
bringing back to power the party that seeks to reunify China. Even though Ma              
continued to advance Taiwan’s independence (stating that it was not his party’s goal),             
he ensured that the cross-straits relationship was well-maintained. Ma’s strategy was           
to put forth Taiwan as an autonomous state but also to encourage Taiwan to establish               
a common market and direct transportation lines with Mainland China. 
Finally, the recent incumbent president Tsai Ing-wen who is part of the DPP,             
took things the other way as she criticized Ma’s stance on allowing Taiwan to become               
14 World Journal. 2003. Bian: there will be no referendum if Taiwan acquires WHO membership. 
World Journal. August 19. Retrieved from: http://www.chineseworld.com. 
15 Culpan, Tim and Pan, Philip P. 2004. ​Taiwan alters arms referendum language​. Washington 
Post, January 17. Retrieved from: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23616-2004 Jan16.html 
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a sovereign state. She is now in her second term and her position toward the               
cross-strait relation does not depart far from that of her party to see Taiwan as an                
independent state. Even though she sees the need to maintain good trade and             
economic networks with China, she also recognizes the need to diversify so that             
Taiwan will not be overly reliant on China. She is also more liberal in her policies in                 
the way she view minority groups in society such as the LGBT groups.   16
The back and forth diplomatically with regards to China then further caused            
citizens to question their identity. Could they possibly be politically Taiwanese but            
culturally Chinese? Could they be both Chinese and Taiwanese at the same time? An              
additional complication has arisen here as different generations, due to their           
experience of different political administrations, perceive themselves differently from         
each other. The older generation thinks that they are Chinese, but many of the              
younger generation strongly believes that Taiwan is a separate state and must profess             
its independence to avoid being taken advantage of by the big power of rising China.  
This conflict then gave rise to the Sunflower Movement in 2014, which was an              
all-time largest anti-China protest. In ​Who Supports the Sunflower Movement? An           
Examination of Nationalist Sentiments​, Chen and Yen write that in protest against the             
Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement with China, Taiwan’s university students         
stormed the national legislature and unexpectedly gave rise to a 24-day occupation of             
parliament, and a subsequent political crisis. It was arguably the largest and longest             
episode of collective contention in Taiwan. In the end, the Sunflower Movement was             
peacefully concluded, with the dispute free-trade agreement halted in the legislative           
16 Hsieh, Y., & Skelton, T. (2017). Sunflowers, youthful protestors and political achievements: 
lessons from Taiwan. Children's Geographies, 16(1), 105-113. doi: 
10.1080/14733285.2017.1391977 
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process. The young wanted to protect their identity as Taiwanese and block approval             
of the KMT’s proposed Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) with China           
without a detailed analysis and review of the deal. Even so, the young opinions were               
split. At first glance, the Sunflower Movement may have seemed like an “anti-China”             
movement, but it is part of a larger post-democratization trend. Many marginalized            
young students have joined in protests, highlighting the class and generational           
elements of the movement.   17
With that, what exactly is the resident’s affiliation and further, what is            
Taiwan’s national identity as a result of the cross-strait relations?  
 
Contradictions in China and Taiwan’s Economic Relationship and Ties 
In the post-Mao era, economic ties between China and Taiwan were           
strengthened with the goal of reunification. China and Taiwan’s economy were both            
similar to one another, and the economies were complementary. Majority of the            
Taiwanese then, see themselves as Chinese. Even up till today​, ​more than 66 per cent               
of Taiwan’s outgoing foreign investment goes to China and it is Taiwan’s main             
trading partner.   18
With greater cross-strait economic inter-reliance and Taiwan’s greater push for          
democratization, the meaning of Taiwanese self-identification is increasingly        
perplexing Taiwanese residents. Some individuals in Taiwan think that giving support           
to the liberalization of the economy with China is a method used to encourage              
17 Chen, F., & Yen, W. 2016. Who Supports the Sunflower Movement? An Examination of 
Nationalist Sentiments. Journal Of Asian And African Studies, 52(8), 1193-1212. doi: 
10.1177/0021909616645372 
18 Yabuki, S., & Harner, S. 2018. China's New Political Economy. Boulder: Routledge. 
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unification and backing economic constraints with China is the same as maintaining a             
distinct, autonomous Taiwan.  
On China’s part, the incumbent President Xi is furthering the administration’s           
goals of the founding of the One People’s Republic of China. As China sees Taiwan               
as part of it, it wants to be responsible for all political and military concerns of                
Taiwan. Beijing, itself, is extremely antagonistic to any form of policies or actions             
that seem to represent any form of a permanent split of Taiwan from China. Because               
the signs of this are already appearing, it is increasingly aggressive in proposing             
revisions to the educational curriculum, in a bid to “salvage” the new generation and              
reframe the historical events that occur in Taiwan. China also wishes to halt the              
cultivation of a Taiwan national identity, especially amongst the young, that is vastly             
different from that of China. Chinese and Taiwanese identity differs in terms of the              
rule of law, democracy, freedom of speech, and freedom of assembly. To entice             
Taiwan to accept unification, China has granted them more economic advantages.           
However, that still remains unsuccessful. Beijing is extremely anxious that the new            
generation will be brought up in a way that has no affinity and relationship with               
Mainland China.   19
As such, Beijing has already started to put pressure on Tsai through a number              
of measures: lowering the number of Chinese tourists and students in Taiwan; limiting             
the space available for Taiwan’s participating in the multilateral trade; increasing the            
strength of military operations on every side of the Taiwanese island and showcasing             
its military might to prevent any form of conflict that Taiwan seeks; trying to attract               
19 Ibid. 
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Taiwanese graduates to find jobs in China by offering high salaries and affordable             
housing; and finally, seeking to poach Taiwan’s diplomatic allies.   20
While China seems to be impatient and eager to reunify both states, Taiwan             
has taken a patient approach to cross-strait relations. Since most Taiwanese have been             
conditioned to live with the cross-strait tensions and are in favor of maintaining the              
status quo of being seen as a separate state, the political focus of Taiwan is to increase                 
its competitiveness economically, allowing Taiwan to be less reliant on China and            
diversifying its economic partners. This can be seen through the New Southbound            
Policy. Since the current ruling DDP is not China’s preferred political party, they             
choose to not embark in any actions to force China to deal with them in an appropriate                 
manner.   21
The Taiwanese government also seeks to augment the quality of life of its             
people, through greater partnerships with major world powers like the United States            
of America, India, Japan, Australia, as well as the European Union, even though             
Taiwan may not have formal and legitimate diplomatic relationships with them.  
 
Methodology: Situationalism as a Mode to Examine National Identity 
Looking at the political changes and historical events that have occurred in            
Taiwan, this research posits that situationalism is the most effective framework in            
order to examine the shifts in self and national identity of Taiwanese because of how               
the Taiwanese people’s mindset has changed over the years, reacting to changes in             
their situation. To better understand the identities that Taiwanese residents subscribe           
20 Ibid. 
21 Hsieh, Y., & Skelton, T. (2017). Sunflowers, youthful protestors and political achievements: 
lessons from Taiwan. Children's Geographies, 16(1), 105-113. doi: 
10.1080/14733285.2017.1391977 
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to, a recent survey done in 2016 that sought to gain a better understanding how               
Taiwanese viewed their national identity is analyzed. The comprehensive survey was           
part of a paper, ​Explaining National Identity Shift in Taiwan​, by Yang Zhong.  
Taiwanese national identity is a conflicting affiliation between Chinese and          
Taiwanese identities. In this case, will an individual “switch” affiliations due to the             
external context such as the economy, habits of the two cultures, et cetera? This is the                
main question that the survey attempts to answer. 
Viewing China as an opportunity could lead Taiwanese residents to have a            
stronger affiliation to being Chinese but if China is seen as a threat, they may then try                 
to distance themselves away from being a Chinese, and instead desire for an             
autonomous Taiwanese identity. For example, China’s military might is often          
perceived as a threat to Taiwan because of the many missiles that can be pointed to                
Taiwan. On the other hand, should Taiwanese work with China, it can be an amazing               
opportunity given China’s huge markets and links with various countries. It will then             
lead to improve cross-strait relations and peace and stability within the region.  
Yang Zhong’s survey was conducted using systematic sampling to select          
respondents. Given the ongoing view of China as either a direct threat or country of               
opportunity, respondents were primed using a piece of news that discusses greater            
economic cooperation with China either as a threat or an opportunity. Survey            
respondents were then allocated to four groups randomly, ensuring a diverse spread of             
age groups, gender demographics, varied levels of education and areas of residence.   22
Every group was given the same survey questionnaire but the approach           
differed in terms of the primer. Group 1 was not given any sort of primer before the                 
22 Zhong, Y. 2016. Explaining National Identity Shift in Taiwan. Journal Of Contemporary China, 
25(99), 336-352. doi: 10.1080/10670564.2015.1104866 
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questionnaire, Group 2 was given news that puts China in a good light, Group 3 was                
given news that puts China in a negative light, and Group 4 was given both pieces of                 
news. The primer was used as a way to find out if attitudes and affiliation of                
respondents alter when a piece of information is given to them. Even though the              
primer is only but information provided, it is a method used to check if the identities                
of respondents will be swayed. Should identities be something that is fixed, whether             
or not there is a primer would no longer matter. Therefore, Group 1 is used as a                 
control group to ensure consistency in the research.  
Group 4 differed from Group 1 as they were given both pieces of information.              
This was to also done to ensure all variations are taken into account.  
 
Group 2’s prime: China as an opportunity  
 
As the second largest economy around the globe, countries all over are trying             
their best to further their ties with China to improve their own economies. China’s              
huge market grants great opportunities for intentional corporations. Corporations can          
either make use of the low prices of production in China, or prosper by the large                
number of consumers in the Chinese market. China is now known as the globe’s              
largest factory and globe’s largest market. Taiwan should seize this opportunity  
 
To bolster the impact of the prime, respondents were given questions to think             
about and answer: 
a. Do you associate with the fact that China is the globe’s second largest             
economy? 
17 
 
b. Do you associate with the fact that China grants plentiful opportunities for            
businesses and is known as the globe’s largest factory and largest market? 
c. Do you think Taiwan should take the opportunity to gain entrance to the             
Chinese market to avoid being left out?  
 
Group 3’s prime: China as a threat 
Recently, Hillary Clinton articulates her opinion on the cross-strait economic          
exchange. Clinton asserts that Taiwan needs to prudently weigh its options and the             
extent to which it is opening its economy to China. She argues that if Taiwan does not                 
manage to gain economic independence, it will also adversely affect its political            
independence. Becoming too dependent on China will cause Taiwan to become           
susceptible in the long run as China will certainly make increasing demands on             
Taiwan.   23
To bolster the impact of the prime, respondents were given questions to think             
about and answer: 
 
a. Will Taiwan’s economy become progressively dependent on the Chinese         
market? 
b. Will Taiwan gradually lose its ability to gain independence? 
c. Will Taiwan become susceptible to threats and demands made by China?  
 
Doing so enables one to analyse and figure out whether the primers in Group 1               
(no primer), Group 2 (China as an opportunity), Group 3 (China as a threat), Group 4                
23 Yabuki, S., & Harner, S. (2018). China's New Political Economy. Boulder: Routledge. 
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(China can both be an opportunity or a threat) will shape identity of individuals and               
subsequently on national identity. 
To examine the respondent’s stance on national identity, questions relating to           
whether they see Taiwan and China as distinct states, if both countries should be              
reunified, and what should be the name of Taiwan (i.e. Taiwan versus Republic of              
China).  
Further, Inglehart’s generation replacement theory (1997) argues that        24
different environments would lead to the development of a different value system.            
Socialization takes place when one is young and once these values are internalized, it              
is challenging for it to alter. Taiwanese below the age of 30 grew up in an                
environment where China rose up to become a superpower; they may then become             
more sensitive to China as a nation.  
The hypotheses for this research is that: 
1. Providing the primer of China as an opportunity would lead to a consequential             
increase in the affiliation with China. 
2. Providing the primer of China as a threat would lead to a consequential             
increase in the disdain for China. 
3. Providing both primers would lead to no drastic effect on identity 
4. The young are more susceptible to the primer of China as an opportunity or a               
threat. 
 
Findings 
24 ​Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. ​Modernization and Postmodernization : Culture , Economic, and Political 
Change in 43 Society​. Princeton: Princeton University Press  
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The research gave rise to several pertinent findings. Firstly, majority of the            
survey respondents view Taiwan and China as separate states, while a minority view             
them as one single state. Furthermore, Group 1 and Group 4’s findings were             
consistent in which there are little drastic changes to their responses. Yet, even though              
majority of the respondents see Taiwan and China as separate states, they were             
divided on their country’s name (Taiwan versus Republic of China).  
Next, when comparing Groups 2, 3, and 4 with Group 1 (control), the primer              
that purports the view that China is a threat increases an individual’s affiliation with              
Taiwan and increases their disdain to even call themselves a member of the Republic              
of China. In comparison, the primer that supports China as a land of opportunity              
decreases their affiliation with Taiwan and instead respondents are more likely to            
report Republic of China as the name of their country. Therefore, this result confirms              
my research hypotheses that the identity that an individual associates is influenced            
and or determined by environmental factors. Self-identity and subsequently national          
identity is not fixed and rather, it is fluid.  
Besides that, in the questionnaire, when asked about the imagined relationship           
with China (father-son, siblings, couples, friends, acquaintances, or enemies),         
respondents that identified themselves as Taiwanese ddid not see China as a helpful             
sibling that helped in solving the challenging difficulty of Taiwan’s status in the             
international arena, yet they were undecided as to whether China was seen as an              
enemy often picked the option on the fence (acquaintances). For respondents who            
long for reunification, they then see China as a sibling that they would like to rekindle                
20 
 
their relationship with. In comparison, those who think that China will take advantage             
of Taiwan have attitudes of China as an enemy.  25
Even though that is the case, it seems that the primer that purports China’s              
vast amount of opportunities effects are much stronger than that of the one that primes               
respondents for China’s threats. This was an interesting finding.  
 
Variation among Different Generations 
Survey results show that the respondents below the age of 30 have a much              
stronger affiliation to Taiwan and identity as Taiwanese, and none of them see Taiwan              
as being part of China. The impact of the primer is also much higher amongst this age                 
group. This confirms the fourth hypothesis that the young are more susceptible to the              
primer of China as an opportunity.  
Besides the survey results, historical data can also be used to cross-reference            
and to further explain their behavior. This group of individuals is also those who              
possibly took part in the Sunflower movement demonstrations. While they were           
growing up, they have lived through multiple changes in power in their political             
administration. Furthermore, Taiwanese youth grew up in a relatively affluent and           
peaceful society. The young then are increasingly likely to support freedom,           
independence, and democracy over the authoritarian rule of China. The spread of            
information in today’s increasingly technological age also grants them a basis of            
comparison.  26
25 Zhong, Y. 2016. “Explaining National Identity Shift in Taiwan.” ​Journal of Contemporary China​, 
25(99), 336-352. doi: 10.1080/10670564.2015.1104866 
26 Zhong, Y. 2016. “Explaining National Identity Shift in Taiwan.” ​Journal of Contemporary China, 
25(99), 336-352. doi: 10.1080/10670564.2015.1104866 
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As seen in China’s firm stance on Hong Kong’s occupy central movement,            
they are now able to better appreciate Taiwan’s democracy and yearn for it. The state               
that Hong Kong is in right now, where China is compelling Hong Kong to create               
legislation against subversion and seditious acts is something that the young           
Taiwanese wish to steer far away from. Other than that, China’s ban on Chinese              
tourists heading to South Korea is taking a toil on the South Korean tourism industry,               
which is one example of how powerful China can be. Many of the Taiwanese young               
individuals do not wish such an occurrence to happen to them in future and would               
rather the Taiwanese government be a distinct state that does not have to be overly               
reliant on the Chinese economy, as they are extremely afraid that Taiwan may be              
taken over by the larger and more power Chinese government.   27
Despite the close proximity of the two nations, many young Taiwanese still            
choose not to visit Mainland China. Many of them resent that their island is not being                
recognized as a nation in the UN due to Beijing’s strong pressure and clout. It is not                 
permissible for Taiwan to display its national flag or utilize its name as Taiwan (not               
even the Republic of China) in official international events like the Olympics. This             
could be a further explanation for the young Taiwanese’s distaste for China.  
In recent years, because of increasingly attractive salaries and job          
opportunities that China is offering, many young Taiwanese are more willing to move             
to China. This differs from in the past when Taiwanese do not even wish to visit                
China, having the impression of China being unsafe, dirty, and filled with unfriendly             
citizens. Even if they were willing to live in China, due to economic considerations,              
these young individuals still prefer to see themselves as Taiwanese rather than            
27 Ibid. 
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Chinese. “Many graduate students are heading to China to find work, but they come              
back complaining about the widespread corruption in China,” argued one respondent.           
This shows that China’s strategy of attracting youth to their country has not fully              
achieved its intended goals of building stronger affiliations to China. China’s pouring            
of economic resources in attracting the young in Taiwan is unprecedented, but it             
continually choose to neglect the voices of the Taiwanese government under the DDP             
and still tries to force Taiwan to adhere to the One China principle. That is something                
that is creating lots of dissent amongst the young people in Taiwan.   28
In comparison, respondents between the ages of 30 to 49 may not necessarily             
see themselves as one China, but identifies their country as the Republic of China.              
When they were offered the primer that China is a great opportunity, respondents             
were more likely to see both nations, as one of the same while the opposite was true                 
when China is posed as a threat. Historical events show that this was the period where                
Taiwan was commonly known as the Republic of China. According to Inglehart’s            
argument, they are then also less likely to alter their identities and hence identifying              
themselves as part of the Republic of China even though they may not see themselves               
as being Chinese. Even so, during their growing years, they were part of the batch that                
underwent an education curriculum that sees Taiwan as distinct from China and hence             
their stance on their affiliation with China. Also, this was the period of time where               
China shot to fame in the global arena, gaining superpower status economically.            
During the initial years, Taiwan enjoyed some of the privileges of China’s strategy to              
open up its markets. In comparison, the younger generation has a totally different             
impression, as they no longer gain many advantages.   29
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
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Respondents that are above 50 did not seem to be affected by the primers. This               
can be further explained that the older generation are often retired and may not see the                
importance of being part of China or even not being part of China. Financial              
incentives are less important in this age group and many of the respondents in this age                
group may even be part of the descendants of the generation that fled to Taiwan               
during the Chinese Civil War.  
 
Contending Identities 
As such, even though the research shows that situational environments          
influence identities, it is insufficient to address what exactly are the on-the-ground            
sentiments of the residents.  
Even during the presidential elections, the flipping and flopping of KMT and            
DDP seems to suggest that the entire population are still quite divided as to what their                
affiliation is. There is definitely a huge gap in terms of the affiliation between age               
groups and it will take a few more generations for these identities to be realigned.               
Furthermore, the affiliations are conditional and depend on the future actions and            
future economic landscape. Some of the areas in which the two nations differ in              
include how Taiwan is a democratic state and celebrates political freedom while            
China maintains itself as an authoritarian state. In March 2018, China’s Communist            
Party eradicated constitutional limits that are placed on the terms of presidency. This             
enabled Xi Jin Ping to be the ruler of China for an indefinite period of time.  
Those who are in support for reunification continue to support their stance            
even though doing so could have a high cost. The rest remains as swing voters that                
will chart their course according to the climate. With such uncertainties, it definitely             
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poses a challenge in the Taiwanese administration given that it chose to adopt a              
people-centric democracy. The conflicting political identities are a long-standing         
problem but it seems that most Taiwanese share the same sentiments in terms of their               
cultural identities as being distinct from China.  
 
Conclusion 
Overall, this research demonstrates how national identity in Taiwan is fluid,           
and is situational. Even though majority still declare that Taiwan and China are             
distinct states, if the rise of China can be seen as a great opportunity for Taiwan, then                 
some respondents may be inclined to think otherwise. In contrast, if China is             
perceived as a threat, Taiwanese want to steer away from it association with China.  
Much of this identity ambivalence is linked to how China’s rise has a             
complicated impact on cross-strait relations. China’s overbearing and urgent goal of           
reunification is starting to show, causing much tension. Aside from that, Taiwan’s            
multiple shifts in power between different political parties with differing goals and            
agendas has created an environment where its residents are perplexed by what it truly              
means to be a Taiwanese. Though majority of the older generation, like the young,              
sees themselves as distinct from China, they associate their nation with the name of              
Republic of China. Furthermore, the older generation has experienced the advantages           
of the opening of the Chinese markets to Taiwan and, thus, has a more positive               
perception of China. Some of them may even be native Chinese who fled to Taiwan               
during the Chinese Civil War. The younger generation, however, due to the lack of              
freedom and democracy that China pursues, is hesitant to become part of China and              
are afraid of being taken advantage of. The rise in technology has led to greater               
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knowledge of the world around them and many would not want to fall prey to the                
power of China as seen in Hong Kong and South Korea’s case. Even though they do                
not want to be on bad terms with China, they also do not wish to be seen as part of                    
China. Exacerbated by the fact that the Taiwan is still not recognized as a nation-state,               
then how will national identity be constructed and developed?  
That being said, it is not impossible for the Taiwanese identity to revert back              
to one that is more Chinese. The extent to which this could happen is reliant on the                 
strategy that Beijing deploys. As seen in the research, should residents view China             
more positively, there is a swing towards a more Chinese identity. Should China             
continue to impose diplomatic and economic sanctions on Taiwan, it will only cause             
even more dissent from the Taiwanese residents—a similar reaction to when China            
imposed several restrictions in Hong Kong. Otherwise, China could decide to           
minimize the gap and differences between the two nations by embarking on a             
democratization process and enabling the rise of a civil society. Then that would help              
to make China a more inviting society for the Taiwanese. However, at the moment,              
this seems to be something that will happen. China wants to maintain the status quo of                
its authoritarian state, yet still seeks to reclaim Taiwan back to its shores. Its attractive               
promises of economic trade, financial help and resources do not seem inviting to the              
Taiwanese. Instead, many individuals in Taiwan are still wary of the intentions of             
China and feel that they will be taken advantage of.  
Because China is such a powerful nation, Taiwan is also facing increasing            
pressure as it is starts to lose many of its trusted allies to China. The economy of                 
Taiwan has not been that strong and the country is actually losing a lot of its people,                 
jobs, and investment opportunities to China. Taiwanese-Chinese marriages are         
26 
 
becoming more prevalent and Taiwanese are becoming more willing to visit and even             
stay in China. Despite that, many Taiwanese, especially those under 30 years old, still              
see themselves as a true-blue Taiwanese and their attitudes tend toward wanting            
Taiwan to become a distinct and sovereign state, and veer away from any situation              
that puts Taiwan under the control of China.  
Globalization in the modern world has allowed for greater movement of           
professionals and talented individuals. While Taiwan continues to be supportive of           
cross-strait exchanges and cooperation, they still wish to see their collaboration and            
endeavors to be reciprocated. As of now, public sentiments in Taiwan still express             
fear of being “eaten” by China. Without the necessary legislation and regulations, it is              
difficult for Taiwan to cooperate. Taiwan’s government has managed to take their            
own stance to propagate policies to improve their industries, better their           
competitiveness in the international front, and secure the safety of Taiwan’s human            
rights and economic freedom. That is a world that many of the Taiwanese residents              
would like to see, and an identity that is tied to greater political, economic, and social                
freedom. 
Looking at these unique circumstances surrounding Taiwan, we see the ways           
in which identity is a fluid concept and is dependent on one’s surroundings. Also, we               
can argue that Taiwan is an imagined community that has not fully achieved             
independence and recognition by the United Nations. This further intensifies the           
already antagonistic cross-strait relations Taiwan with China.  
Then again, China has risen up so much that now, anyone who seems to be of                
Chinese heritage, including Singaporeans, Malaysians, and definitely Taiwanese are         
perceived to be a part of China. When then will China stop? If it were to consume                 
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Taiwan into its One China Principle, what are the dangerous and long-term            
consequences?  
Taiwanese national identity continues to be contested even today. As Taiwan           
and China maintains closer economic ties, it doesn’t seem like they will one day be               
friends, or even families in the near future. At the end of the day, the closer ties that                  
China proposes are fraught with hidden agendas while Taiwan accepts the ties in their              
bid for economic survival. In turn, this has caused a deep-seated identity confusion             
amongst Taiwanese people, with divisions based on age and generation, and a            
collective national identity that is always in flux.  
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